Tampilkan postingan dengan label Politics Economics. Tampilkan semua postingan
Tampilkan postingan dengan label Politics Economics. Tampilkan semua postingan

Selasa, 24 April 2018

Trump just dealt Wall Street a $135 million blow

U.S. President Donald Trump looks on as Broadcom CEO Hock Tan announces the repatriation of his company’s headquarters to the United States from Singapore during a ceremony in the Oval Office of the White House on November 2, 2017 in Washington, DC.

President Trump issued an executive order Monday blocking Broadcom’s takeover of Qualcomm.
Trump said there is “credible evidence” that Broadcom “might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States.”

Wall Street banks had been due to make a small fortune from advising on the deal.
President Trump issued an executive order Monday blocking the impending takeover of Qualcomm

In doing so, he also likely sent millions in advisory fees for those working on the bid up in smoke.

Moelis & Co., Citi, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley were advising Broadcom on the potential merger. Those banks would have shared between $110 million and $135 million in fees if the deal had completed, Jeffrey Nassof, director of consulting firm Freeman & Co., told Business Insider in November when the bid was first announced.


Bank of America, Citi, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley were also helping arrange debt financing, while Silver Lake Partners had agreed to supply $5 billion in convertible debt financing.

Qualcomm had resisted the takeover offer, hiring Goldman Sachs and Evercore to aid its defence. Had the deal gone ahead, Goldman Sachs and Evercore could have made between $120 million and $145 million in fees, according to Nassof.

Now the deal has been blocked, Qualcomm’s advisers are likely to see some payout, though it’s not clear how much.

The blow to Wall Street could be temporary, with Trump’s decision to block the deal potentially triggering another round of bids. Intel has reportedly been watching the Broadcom-Qualcomm situation with interest, for example.
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Minggu, 22 April 2018

TRUMP: I’m looking at one candidate ‘very strongly’ to replace Gary Cohn as top economic adviser

The race to replace Gary Cohn as the director of the National Economic Council appears to have been narrowed down to one leading candidate.

President Donald Trump said Tuesday that he is “looking at Larry Kudlow very strongly” to take over as his top economic adviser.

“I’ve known him a very long time. We don’t agree on everything, but I think in this case I think that’s good because I want a divergent opinion,” Trump said before boarding Marine One outside the White House.

Multiple reports on Monday suggested that Trump is homing in on Kudlow, who long supported Trump during the 2016 campaign. Kudlow, who has appeared on CNBC since 2001, was previously floated for other economic jobs in the Trump administration.

Separately, a source who has advised Trump on economic issues told Business Insider last week that Kudlow was a leading candidate for the job.

Kudlow, who has been critical of Trump’s approach to trade, recently blasted the president’s decision to impose broad tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum. If he is selected, Kudlow is likely to fill a void of pro-free-trade advocates that has developed in the White House over the past few months.

Trump said Tuesday that Kudlow shifted on the tariffs, despite a recent op-ed attacking the president’s decision to impose trade restrictions on imports of steel and aluminum.

“Hw now has come around to believing in tariffs as also a negotiating point,” Trump said. “You know I’m renegotiating trade deals and without tariffs we wouldn’t do nearly as well.”

A White House spokesperson told Business Insider on Monday there were no personnel announcements at this time.

Kudlow served as a staff economist during the Reagan administration, was the chief economist for Bear Stearns from 1987 to 1994, and has regularly appeared on CNBC since 2001.

The New York Times’ Maggie Haberman and Jim Tankersley reported Saturday that Christopher Liddell was considered the leading candidate for the job. But, Haberman tweeted Monday that Trump cooled on Liddell after a Wall Street Journal editorial blasting the candidate and pushback from other advisors.

Liddell, the White House’s director of strategic initiatives, was previously the CFO of Microsoft and General Motors.

Investors and economists are closely watching the pick, as it could indicate the direction of Trump’s economic agenda, particularly now with trade. Cohn was seen as a free-trade advocate who pushed back on Trump’s desires for large tariffs and trade restrictions, and a replacement favoring trade barriers could set off concern that Trump will lean into his protectionist tendencies.
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Minggu, 15 April 2018

AS CLOSE AS IT GETS: Democratic underdog declares victory as special election comes down to the wire

Democrat Conor Lamb is close to pulling off a remarkable victory in Pennsylvania’s 18th Congressional District.
Right now, the race is officially too close to call.
Lamb, however, declared victory in the wee hours of Wednesday morning.
The candidates are separated by several hundred votes and less than 1 percentage point.
President Donald Trump won the district by 20 points in 2016.
Democrat Conor Lamb moved close to pulling off an improbable win, keeping the Democratic momentum going on Tuesday as he led Republican Rick Saccone in the special election for Pennsylvania’s 18th Congressional District.

With more than 99% of precincts reporting, Lamb held a lead of less than 1,000 votes over Saccone.

Saccone would need a real boost in the remaining absentee ballots to leapfrog Lamb. Already, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee declared victory for Lamb, with Rep. Ben Ray Lujan of New Mexico, chair of the DCCC, saying the results “should terrify Republicans.”

Just before 12:45 a.m. on the East Coast on Wednesday, Lamb declared victory at his election event.

“It took a little longer than we thought, but we did it,” he said.

Meanwhile, National Republican Congressional Committee communications director Matt Gorman said in a statement that the “race is too close to call and we’re ready to ensure that every legal vote is counted.”

“Once they are, we’re confident Rick Saccone will be the newest Republican member of Congress,” Gorman said.

Polls heading into Tuesday showed a tight race in a district President Donald Trump won by 20 points in 2016, with some showing Lamb, a former Marine and federal prosecutor, ahead significantly. The seat became open after longtime Republican Rep. Tim Murphy resigned from office late last year following an abortion-related scandal.

Republicans went into the day blasting Saccone, a state legislator and Air Force veteran, for running a subpar campaign in a race they increasingly expected to close. Trump still enjoys decent approval ratings in the district and attempted to push Saccone over the top with a weekend visit.

“Conor Lamb is gonna win,” a national Republican close to the race conceded to Business Insider hours prior to polls closing. “I think it’s been a race, since day one, about candidate disparity.”

Results showed a significant shift toward the Democratic candidate when compared to the 2016 election:

View image on Twitter

Another Republican strategist close to the race cited the “disparity between the candidates having an outsized impact.”

“Conor Lamb is exciting, he does break the mold a little bit,” the strategist said. “And he does sound like the kind of Democrat that your typical voter in that sort of district could support. Saccone, unfortunately just has never been able to excite people in the district. His shortcomings were noticed by a handful of strategists early on.”

Lamb has dominated the fundraising battle against Saccone in the special election for Pennsylvania’s 18th Congressional District, which Republicans highlighted as a significant problem for their candidate.


Outside groups had sought to make up the fundraising difference by injecting money and support into the race. The Congressional Leadership Fund, for example, provided 50 door knockers and spent more than $3.5 million on the election effort. The race featured more than $12 million in spending on both sides, with the airwaves flooded with an inordinate number of ads.

Lamb’s performance is of huge concern to Republicans heading into the 2018 midterms, which increasingly look as if they will be a challenging landscape for GOP House and Senate candidates. Traditionally, the first midterm elections under a new president go for the party out of the White House.

“It should serve as a wake-up call to everybody,” one Republican strategist said of the race.

Lamb ran as a centrist Democrat, embracing gun rights, expressing opposition to abortion personally but supporting abortion rights, and saying that he supports a middle class tax cut though he vehemently opposes the Republican tax plan. Saccone pitched himself as “Trump before Trump” and sought to tie himself closely to the president and his agenda, which remain decently popular in the district.

A number of policies were on the ballot as well, by proxy. This was the first major election since Republicans passed their tax overhaul. At the same time, Trump reportedly pitched his steel and aluminum tariffs with an eye on the race, hoping they could help prop up Saccone. But polling showed the tariffs did little to swing votes.

By a weird quirk, both Lamb and Saccone could be members of Congress by January 2019. Lamb and Saccone are both likely to run in different districts if they choose to seek office again because Pennsylvania’s congressional map will be redrawn before this fall’s races.
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Jumat, 13 April 2018

Here’s why the Pennsylvania special election result should freak out Republicans

There’s been a lot of either-or argument over what the future of the Democratic Party should be. Should Democrats seek to build a coalition of college-educated suburbanites plus white urbanites and minorities, or should they try to win back blue-collar white voters who have fallen away from the party in recent decades?

In the special election on Tuesday in Pennsylvania’s 18th Congressional District, a place where President Trump won by 20 points in 2016, likely winner Democrat Conor Lamb showed Democrats don’t have to choose. He managed to do three things at once:
Maintain gains that Hillary Clinton made in affluent, educated suburban areas in 2016,
Regain working-class voters who picked Barack Obama in 2008 or 2012 but rejected Clinton in 2016, and
Win over voters who rejected Obama and Clinton in all three elections.
These results should hearten Democrats and scare Republicans, especially when examined on a town-by-town basis.

Consider, for example, Mt. Lebanon, an affluent and highly educated Pittsburgh suburb that’s included in the 18th. Obama took 54% of the two-party vote here in 2012.

Despite losing the state, Clinton improved strongly on Obama’s performance in Mt. Lebanon, as she did in many suburban, well-to-do areas in Pennsylvania. She got 64% of the two-party vote.

On Tuesday, Conor Lamb got 72%.

Now consider Franklin Township in rural Greene County, where the median family income is less than half what it is in Mt. Lebanon.

While this area of Pennsylvania has a Democratic tradition, recent Democratic presidential nominees have done poorly here. Barack Obama got 34% of the two-party vote, and Hillary Clinton got just 28%.

Conor Lamb managed 43% on Tuesday.

That is, he did better than Clinton where Clinton did better than Obama, and better than Obama where Obama did better than Clinton.

Now, imagine that laid out across the country: Democratic candidates holding together the Clinton coalition, while rebuilding the Obama coalition and then adding on some new voters who weren’t part of either.

This result bodes well in places like Orange County, California, and central New Jersey: affluent suburbs where Clinton won in spite of a long Republican tradition. And it bodes just as well in places like eastern Iowa – and other Rust Belt districts like Pennsylvania’s 18th – where Democrats have lost their previous strength.

This is just one election result, though it’s in line with many other special election results where Democrats have strongly outperformed their 2016 results. But it’s one that should make Republicans feel bad about their odds in November – and one that should make Democrats reconsider how much they really need to fight among themselves about the future direction of the Democratic coalition.
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Kamis, 12 April 2018

Export orientation, supply-side thinking, and the theodicy of markets

This blog has argued (hardly uniquely) that the focus of the German and Eurocrat policymaking establishment on exports and competitiveness is destructive for the Eurozone's economy. Today, I want to argue that there's an intellectual feedback loop between highlighting export-led growth and the belief that individual, company, or country merit determines economic success. This is very much work in progress, and I'd particularly welcome feedback.

Early in July, Angela Merkel's party, the CDU, held its "Economy Day." The head of the party's economic council began with an excerpt from the Treasury of Teutonic Stereotypes a pronouncement. "Economic success is no gift;" he said, "rather, it must be earned every day through hard work." 

I have a name for this kind of thinking: the "theodicy of markets."  In the study of religion, theodicy refers to the problem of reconciling the existence of evil with the presence of a god both omnipotent and benevolent (here's a moving example).  But Max Weber used the term more generally, to refer to a doctrine that explains and justifies good and bad fortune. He wrote:

The fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to know that he has a right to his good fortune. He wants to be convinced that he ‘deserves’ it, and above all, that he deserves it in comparison with others.

A theodicy, in Weber's sense, explains why people deserve what they get. A theodicy of markets argues that those who flourish in a market economy deserve to do so. The sentiment expressed above is an example: economic success is no gift--it's deserved, because it results from hard work.

Weber's argument--made in the context of religion--is that intellectuals work hard on their theodicies trying to make them logically coherent. The intellectual difficulties they confront drive the development of doctrine and thereby influence action.

In this light, it's worth investigating the intellectual challenges facing the theodicy of markets.
Mapping desert (or merit) onto market outcomes is at best a dicey business, because it implicitly involves endorsing the fairness of the multitude of bargaining situations determining relative prices. (Germany, for instance, is an exporter of luxury cars, demand for which probably has something to do with increased economic inequality in the countries beyond its borders.) To refer to "productivity" as justifying success is just to rename the problem, since productivity is measured with respect to output prices.

More generally, at a very high level of abstraction, success in any endeavour is a joint product of merit (skill and effort) and circumstances. To maintain a claim that success is deserved, prediction of and adaptation to circumstances can be defined as part of the relevant success-generating effort. However, this move requires a very particular conception of circumstances: they must be amenable to prediction and, hence, fairly resistant to change, including change through the vagaries of deliberate human action.  An actor's success under a given set of circumstances would otherwise have to be ascribed in part to some other actor's decision not to change those circumstances, downgrading the importance of desert.  

Now in talking about the concrete issue of economic success such a conception of circumstances is, of course, quite absurd. The circumstances under which economic success is pursued can and do change due to deliberate action. Even Mr Lauk, who told us economic success is no gift, concedes in another context that sanctions on Russia will damage the German economy. So prior economic success was, in part, a "gift" of good relations with Russia (not to mention the purchasing power gifted to Russian consumers by high oil prices). 

So how does one maintain a theodicy of markets in the face of the manifest role of manipulable circumstances?  Consider this remarkable July 2014 statement from Andreas Dombret, a member of the board of the Bundesbank:
[The] strong influence of international trade [on Germany's recovery] worried some observers. Many felt that Germany's reliance on exports was risky, as it exposed Germany to the ups and downs of the global economy. ... 
I have doubts that turning away from global markets would strengthen the German economy. Facing global competition ensures that German companies keep up with technological progress and retain their high productivity. This might come at the price of higher volatility, but to me this seems like a price worth paying.
The first thing to note is how very, very weak this is as a piece of economic argumentation.  To claim that policy of supporting domestic demand is equivalent to a policy of insulating firms from international competition is absurd--indeed, one of the arguments sometimes made against demand stimulus is that its effectiveness is limited when consumers prefer foreign to domestic products. 

Given the flimsy argument, maybe Dombret's statement is better understood as motivated reasoning emerging from an emotional commitment to the theodicy of markets. In particular, it resolves the problem of reconciling merit with the role of circumstances by
Partitioning circumstances under which economic success is pursued into the mutable (domestic demand) and the immutable ("the ups and downs of the global economy").  
Asserting that altering the mutable circumstances would undermine the promotion of merit ("productivity") and should thus be avoided.

One implication of [1] is that there ought to be a strong "elective affinity" between a commitment to the theodicy of markets and support for an export-led demand model. Export performance is the true test of economic merit, precisely because exports are directed into a "global economy" imagined as impermeable to policy manipulation. 

Imagined is the right word here, because of course "the ups and downs of the global economy" are strongly affected by policy decisions in individual nation-states. Or course, this problem could be avoided if every nation-state would accept the self-denying ordinance to ensure the triumph of merit by avoiding demand stimulus. Here's Bundesbank head Jens Weidmann throwing cold water on the idea that external circumstances should be changed in an interview with Le Monde (German, French) last month:

In general I am sceptically inclined to the idea that one can demand a contribution from others to one's own sustainable growth... Growth must instead come through one's own efforts. It is the responsibility not of the governments of neighbouring countries nor of the European Central Bank, but rather of each government to create a domestic environment that supports business innovation and employment.

And here he is in Spain in July:
At the time [of founding the Euro and agreeing the deficit-limiting Maastricht criteria], it was assumed that by constraining governments' ability to fiscally stimulate demand - and by shifting monetary policy to the European level - governments would have no choice but to implement structural reforms, improve their supply side, and strengthen their potential for sustainable growth.
Note the use of the word "sustainable" in both contexts, which seems to me to be another tactic of displacement, analogous to the rejection of demand stimulus, an implicit assertion that the market generates morally appropriate outcomes, at least in the long run (when, of course, we're all dead).

To sum up, then: to sustain the idea that "economic success is no gift" requires some substantial mental gymnastics with deeply destructive consequences for economic policy; in particular, it promotes an unrealistic reliance on export demand. I'd be very curious to hear from readers whether they found this convincing and/or of interest.
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Selasa, 03 April 2018

The Basic Income and the Cult of Work

If you have the sort of task like, say Chuka Umunna, you won't need to peer the stop of work. You get a hefty revenue, you're the boss of your own workplace, you are reputable by your peers and considered to be someone who subjects, and first-rate long breaks help punctuate existence at Westminster. If, alternatively, your experience of work is a life of drudge, humiliation and insecurity there's a very good danger your views would possibly differ. The majority of people who work might like the habitual and shape a work day gives them. It might confer a experience of reason and provide a social lifestyles, however on the end of it most of the people would not do what they do in the event that they failed to must. Millions of people paintings genuinely because they haven't any desire.

We live in a society that makes a fetish out of work. One's trajectory thru the schooling system is (supposedly) guided through getting a decent activity at the give up of it. People's engagement with social protection is supposed to be a brief issue with the item of throwing them back into the place of work at the earliest opportunity. And if people are not working, they're feckless and bone idle and made to experience that way - by no means mind how unemployment continually exceeds the number of vacancies. And  what? It's all so bloody pointless. While there are people without jobs, masses of these with them are overworked. Work time too regularly bleeds into home time as paintings masses are impossible to manipulate as challenge piles upon venture. Or at any time the phone threatens to go with a "request" to are available in, shattering your unfastened time and reminding you a while is their largesse. Too many places of work are permanently quick staffed, and the enjoy of work is a dizzying affair of plate spinning and recurring. Life isn't always for enjoyment, it's a treadmill for endless tens of millions who recognize when they reach retirement that they may be too knackered or too unwell to do the things they constantly wanted to. Life is far too brief to be spent and bent in involuntary servitude, in particular when work may be planned and shared out equitably.

I wasn't amazed to discover Chuka's a lot trailed competition to the simple earnings couched as a defence of the cult of labor. Nor that his argument is virtually identical to criticisms previously ventured through Yvette Cooper. That does not suggest it isn't always nerve-racking, or won't be taken critically in some quarters. But severely, just look at the nation of it. Nonsense about fundamental profits meaning humans living off the state, dwelling vacuous, purposeless lives, of "giving up" on creating new jobs, it is a miserable workout in how impoverished the political creativeness can end up. For instance, within the coming wave of automation,

Work could emerge as more satisfying. In the new economic system our most treasured asset could be people. We have emotional intelligence and belief, and the capacity to create, empathise, convince and purpose in abstract approaches. We can make inventive leaps, and we have instinct. In the brand new economic system what's going to have delivered cost is what's devalued today – the emotional labour of being concerned, communicating, developing and connecting.

As if all this is depending on the archaic compulsion of changing our capability to labour for wages or a revenue. Technology need to not be deployed to create extra bullshit jobs so more human beings can spend their quality years doing meaningless, socially vain tasks. It have to be deployed to reduce the running week, to unfold the wealth we create, and to make us free from the need of waged labour. The future has to be something higher than a human being chained to a table, forever. And it totally can be.

What the basic income offers is a guaranteed, no-strings income to all. If cash way freedom and desire, this is precisely what it confers. It lets in humans the selection to spend their time engaged in socially productive voluntary paintings or to take a seat at domestic and play video video games. People have the liberty to indulge their passions. They can engage in entrepreneurial interest with out the hazard of wreck, as individuals, small partnerships or cooperative ventures. They are unfastened to dip inside and out of the education gadget, and achieve this while not having studying time eaten up by using work. And likewise, humans can retire early from paintings, boost a own family, attend to complete-time caring with out worry and insecurity. We understand a fundamental profits can do that, because trials show it.

Yes, there are simple earning and basic incomes. It has its enthusiasts on the right as well as the left. For the previous, knowledgeable as it's far through Californian tech-bro libertarianism, establishing a simple earnings allows for the abolition of social protection and a whole bunch of liabilities agencies shell out for. The basic income is a way of socialising danger, and supporting support a populace at the same time as Silicon Valley capital parasites off its facts. Others favour pitching the simple profits at a totally low stage so it does not intrude on paintings incentives. I.E. The necessity of operating. Left strategies to simple profits must reject both and pitch it at a degree that permits for a comfortable life that reproduces people in all their material, social and cultural complexity.

Would this gift a capitalist economic system severe difficulties of variation? Absolutely, however then we're supposed to be within the commercial enterprise of moving beyond markets and artificial scarcity. If capital desires to survive, it would have to transform the nature of work totally. Without compulsion, abruptly the (potential) employee has the upper hand within the capital/labour relationship. Capital would don't have any choice but to innovate and automate as tons as it possibly can, because to draw personnel, wages, which might definitely grow to be reimbursement for people's time, would must be tons better than they're currently. The conditions of labor might ought to be better. Work might need to end up extra profitable and enriching. And, who knows, due to the fact work could be finished through those who want to be there perhaps it is probably a more first-rate enjoy all spherical. Meanwhile the relaxation of society might circulate away from the economic vital, experiment with new methods of establishing things, and as all and sundry has a guaranteed true wellknown of residing may additionally determine to consign money itself to the museums.

It's this, in the end, which underpins the hostility Chuka and his friends have closer to the simple income. Theirs is not a realistic reputation of research that prove work is ideal for you however a deep seated fear that the precept of a simple profits, once mounted and practiced, is some thing that works towards the very logics of compulsion and class battle capitalism is depending on. And this is motive sufficient to assist it.
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Kamis, 29 Maret 2018

Saving The Planet: Why Cap-and-Trade Is Not Fit For Purpose

A consensus is finally shaping up among international policy-makers. Market-based emissions trading has become the modern world's primary pollution control mechanism, forming a key part of various national and international bodies' commitment to climate change mitigation. The largest such market is the European Union's Emissions Trading System, which accounts for over 90% of the world's carbon market volume, but market trading systems are also a key part of the Kyoto protocol under the Clean Development Mechanism, and looks set to be adopted in China in the near future. Unfortunately cap-and-trade emissions systems are structurally incapable of delivering us from climate change.

To understand why the emissions-trading regime has come to dominate, it is important to understand its appeal. The first step is a government's imposing of a cap on carbon emissions within a country for any given year. Permits are then created up to the level of this cap, with one permit representing 1 tonne of CO2. These permits are then allocated to businesses, which can then trade the permits amongst one another. This trading amongst permit users puts a price on pollution, incentivising businesses to reduce their carbon footprint so as to be able to sell permits to businesses which are more carbon-dependent, which in turn strive to reduce the number they must buy. Thus, the social goal of reducing carbon emissions is internalised into the profit motive. By ensuring that companies can trade permits, the emissions trading system ensures that the emissions reductions will happen at the lowest possible cost. How so?

Let's say there's a shortage of eggs in my village, and the village leader decides to allocate the reduced supply equally amongst the inhabitants. While it may seem fair if everyone in my omelette-loving village has to cut back their egg consumption to 2 per week, this will not affect everyone equally. For example, I would have to close down my pancake house, which caters for both villagers and foreign travellers passing through. A cap-and-trade mechanism would incentivize some people in the village to reduce or cut out their egg consumption entirely so as to sell their egg ration to me. Since the eggs are worth more to me than to others (being the source of my livelihood) this ensures that the total reductions already imposed are achieved at the lowest social cost.

It is easy to see why economists would be drawn to a cap-and-trade mechanism for pollution control. It has that wonderful counter-intuitive feel to it that economic reasoning so often engenders, and it is breathtakingly simple and obviously efficient. With governing agencies setting a limit to emissions per year, businesses can ensure that the most cost-effective way of meeting this limit will be found. Then, year on year, the number of permits can be lowered, ensuring that the economy's total carbon footprint is reduced. Allowing us to continue our energy-intensive consumer lifestyle as well as mitigating climate change, this economic mechanism allows us to have our cake and eat it too.

At least, that's how the story is supposed to go. The problem is that the effectiveness of the carbon markets which have been initiated so far has been…well, let's go with ‘questionable'. In the first phase of the EU's Emissions Trading System there was actually a rise in emissions, whereas in the second phase, the price of carbon credits fell to a level whereby there was little incentive for businesses to adapt their polluting activities. Oscar Reyes, of the Institute for Policy Studies, notes that for the UN Clean Development Mechanism, a combination of the financial and economic recessions linked with poor management of emissions trading "resulted in a 99% percent decline in carbon credit prices between 2008 and 2013". Perhaps ‘questionable' wasn't the right word.

Indeed, very few people today would suggest that emissions trading is fit for purpose. Still, the logic of cap-and-trade seems sound, and indeed there are many explanations for the failure of specific carbon markets which lie outside its economic logic. For example, too many permits were initially given out causing their price to plummet, exacerbated by the fact that permits were often given out free to major polluters as opposed to being auctioned off. Another issue is the creation of a carbon offsets market, which allows companies to gain and trade ‘carbon credits' for reducing expected future emissions. Granting credits based on counterfactuals naturally leads to difficulties and perverse incentives, such as buying a chunk of rainforest in order to claim a credit for not cutting it down. The offset market also allows developed countries to outsource their carbon reductions to poorer, underdeveloped areas rather than pursuing cleaner technologies.

These are all relevant points. But they don't tell the full story. The inconvenient truth is that while cap-and-trade could be designed so as to operate more efficiently, inherent in it are some problems which cannot be reduced to implementation issues. If we are serious about climate change mitigation we are going to have to rethink our policy consensus.

The problem lies in the nature of the incentives an emissions trading market introduces. It is true that businesses have an incentive to reduce their emissions, but it will not be clear how much of an incentive they have to do so. This is because we do not know how quickly or extensively prices will change as a response to fluctuating demand. Fixing the quantity of emissions within an economy will necessarily lead to such price volatility, as we cannot have both price certainty and quantity certainty in a carbon market. This should be relatively clear after a moment's thought. Given a fixed quantity of permits, the price of those permits will depend upon how many people are willing to purchase them, and how much they are willing to spend, i.e. matters outside businesses' control and foresight such as the availability of clean-energy technology and the state of the economy. In short, if supply is fixed, prices will adjust based on changing demand.

This is important, as price signals are hugely significant for businesses when making medium to long-term investment decisions. Investing in green technology and radically reducing one's carbon footprint could be one such investment, but the cap-and-trade system fails to give any clear, stable signal as to whether doing so would be a financially prudent investment. If a business must invest for example 5% of its annual profits for 10 years in making the shift to a low carbon business model, it must have good reason to believe that this money is not being wasted. This cannot be the case today, since no one can say what the cost of carbon emissions will be in 10 years time.

It may be said that the ever-reducing cap on permits will lead to a rise in the price of carbon, as this should (if correctly designed) lead to increasing scarcity. This will result in businesses bidding against one another for fewer permits each year, gradually raising the price in the market. While this is basically true, it misses the point, or rather, two points. The first is that it is not whether it will prove profitable in the long-run to operate with clean technologies that matters - the decision problem for businesses is that they cannot predict how profitable it will be, and when it will start becoming profitable.  Certainly there is some vague, long-term incentive to reduce emissions, but the price signal is not precise enough to be action-directing in the way that climate change mitigation requires. This is especially disappointing since one of the very benefits of harnessing market mechanisms to combat climate change was supposed to be converting a general but diffuse global responsibility to change our ways into specific and calibrated incentives for key actors whose choices of technologies and outputs determine the climactic effects of our personal and social lifestyles.

The other point, or perhaps another aspect of the same incentive weakness, is a variation on the free-rider problem. If I look at the state of the economy while trying to make a decision as to whether to invest in expensive clean technologies, cap-and-trade does not provide me with any incentive to invest. If I think other companies will invest in these technologies, then I can simply wait for them to develop clean technologies at great cost and effort, and then either copy them or just buy the permits made cheaper by their carbon savings. Of course, if everybody acts the same way, carbon will remain expensive, perhaps so expensive that the system would collapse. In which case I still would not be damaged relative to my competitors by refusing to reduce my carbon emissions. As a polluting business it appears that my dominant strategy whatever my competitors do is to carry on as usual. Perhaps some easily and cheaply made reductions might make sense at the margin, but not the radical investments and restructuring that policymakers are hoping for.  

This gets at the heart of the fundamental weakness of cap-and-trade. It applies to the economy as a whole, but some industries, such as electricity generation, emit orders of magnitude more carbon than others, and it is precisely these industries that are least incentivised to adapt their business practices. By explicitly targeting the low-hanging fruit first, cap-and-trade advocates suppose that once the cheapest to remove emissions have been addressed there will be a smooth and automatic progression to removing more entrenched sources of emissions such as air travel or cement production.

The difficulty with this is that the pursuit of minor, short-term reductions which have immediate pay-off may well lead the economy away from the path we need to take to achieve our long-term goal of preventing disastrous climate change. Small short-term gains may involve making adjustments to an existing technology whereas long-term solutions may demand scrapping that technology altogether. Think for a minute about the fixed capital in power plants, chemical refineries, airplane fleets, and so on with their decades long operational lives. Once built, their carbon emissions per unit of output are more or less fixed. Moreover, once they are built it would be very inefficient to build another greener version of the same plant. To succeed in preventing catastrophic climate change it is these large and irreversible investment decisions, not day to day production decisions, that policy makers must strive to influence. Yet cap-and-trade protects high polluters from the need to make radical reforms to their business models by allowing them to purchase permits from businesses that do not pose as grave a climate risk. Thus, cap-and-trade is locking in precisely those industrial technologies and business practices which most need to be changed. The high-hanging fruit will actually become harder to reach.

The question then is what can be done about any of this. We do not have to renounce market mechanisms as a key tool in climate change mitigation. Businesses can and should be incentivised to reduce their carbon footprint. A price on carbon is still necessary – we just need a better of imposing one than that indirectly produced by cap-and-trade. A carbon tax is in some senses the mirror image of cap-and-trade, as it fixes the price of carbon emissions as opposed to theirquantity, thereby addressing the problems I identified. While we cannot guarantee precisely how much carbon would be emitted each year at any particular level of carbon tax, there would be a clear price signal by which businesses can forecast the financial costs and benefits of investing in low carbon technologies and business practices. If a straightforward carbon tax is politically infeasible, a hybrid policy which fixed a minimum price floor for carbon permits would at least be an improvement, by mitigating the uncertainty involved and perhaps the free-rider problem.

Of course, this analysis does not preclude the very real possibility that putting a price on carbon, by whatever means, will not be enough to keep climate change under control. We would be remiss not to use the other, more interventionist tools at our disposal, such as government regulations, punitive trade rules for free-riding countries, and technology development subsidies. We should not be surprised if we truly do face a choice between having our cake and eating it, between consuming our world and living in it.
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Rabu, 28 Maret 2018

Transformational Politics Demands Transformational Economics.

If all you ever do is all all people has ever finished, then what are the possibilities that some thing will ever alternate? Something within the Marxist nucleotide of Labour’s DNA continues to carry forward the message that economics and politics are inextricably connected. Stuff up the previous and the latter will unexpectedly observe suit. That being the case, Grant Robertson may be Labour’s worst enemy.

Not that he ought to experience too badly approximately that, because Labour finance ministers have a nicely-mounted ancient popularity for being their party’s worst enemies.

One has only to consider Philp Snowden, Chancellor of the Exchequer in Britain’s first and second Labour governments. While nobody may want to fault the antique man’s determination to Labour’s working-elegance electorate, his thoroughly traditional economic ideas left him helpless in the face of the Great Depression. In the words of his biographer, Keith Laybourn: “He became raised in an atmosphere which regarded borrowing as an evil and loose alternate as an important ingredient of prosperity.”

It become Snowden’s unwavering faith in those nineteenth century liberal orthodoxies that broke his celebration and discredited his authorities. The people who paid the price for their Chancellor’s highbrow pressure had been (as is so often the case) his loved running-magnificence.

Things might have long past the same manner here in New Zealand only some years later had the proposals of Labour’s economically orthodox leaders (Michael Joseph Savage, Peter Fraser and Walter Nash) not been voted down via the more radical members in their birthday celebration’s caucus.

It was way to this latter organization that Labour went into the 1935 election with an financial policy calling for the “instantaneous manipulate by using the country of the whole banking system; the supply of foreign money and credit to ensure good enough production, guaranteed expenses and wages; readjustment of all mortgages” – together with a coverage of kingdom-fostered industrialisation which, these days, could be described as “financial nationalism”.

How very distinct these policies had been from the rules of Roger Douglas, the Labour Finance Minister who championed the identical laissez-faire financial rules applied by means of Philip Snowden between 1929 and 1931. “Rogernomics” extensively converted New Zealand’s economy and politics – and very nearly destroyed the New Zealand Labour Party!

The two politicians most accountable for rescuing Labour from political oblivion had been Helen Clark and Michael Cullen. In a double act of extraordinary sophistication, Clark and Cullen kept maintain of the political reins for nine years with the aid of cleverly protecting both the true volume of their authorities’s monetary achievement, and the political possibilities it opened-up.

As Finance Minister, Cullen proved a master at making his burgeoning sales surpluses, which would possibly have funded a far greater ambitious social-democratic programme, disappear.

Some of Cullen’s billions were invested within the special superannuation fund that still bears his name. Even greater went into Working for Families, the huge enterprise subsidy which Cullen delivered in preference to allowing the change unions to extract the money from company shareholders. Most of Cullen’s surplus billions, however, were directed closer to paying down Crown debt.

The possibility fee of these fiscal diversions would only grow to be apparent toward the give up of the following decade, whilst New Zealand’s bodily and social infrastructure commenced to, quite genuinely, disintegrate.

That Michael Cullen has for many years been Grant Robertson’s political customer and mentor bodes unwell for the expectancies of Labour, NZ First and Green Party individuals that Jacinda Ardern will, indeed, usher within the “transformational” alternate promised inside the new authorities’s coalition settlement.

Even earlier than he received his ministerial warrant, Robertson became at pains to bind Labour to precisely the same diversionary economic techniques pioneered with the aid of Cullen.

A Finance Minister who time and again swears allegiance to his own “Budget Responsibility Rules” is not likely to champion the kind of creative and innovative economics that makes for innovative and progressive politics.

Unless, like Savage, Fraser and Nash; Ardern, David Parker and Robertson are reined-in by using a Labour caucus determined to fulfil their authorities’s “transformational” objectives, then the lengthy-deferred renovation of New Zealand’s disintegrating institutional and bodily infrastructure will no longer get hold of the sources it calls for.

A transformational government can not be brought into being besides by way of transformational economics. For all his faults, Roger Douglas understood this essential proposition. Progressive electorate need a Finance Minister whose monetary policies are as ambitious as his government’s political promises.
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Selasa, 27 Maret 2018

A Team Approach to Intergenerational Justice

We have difficulty living up to our obligations to future generations. To be precise, our problem is not not that we don’t care about what happens to the world after we're gone. It is that we can’t explain why we should care, and therefore cannot systematically think through and institutionalise the responsibilities implied. That might not matter so much - it hasn't mattered too much before in human history - except that we face at least one big intergenerational problem that just can't be muddled through: Climate Change.

If the underlying problem is conceptual, philosophers should be able to help. Unfortunately, contractarianism, the best account of political liberalism, and of our democratic ideals, seems stuck in the present because it overrepresents the voices of present voters. The other main contender in what seems a rather impoverished repertoire is utilitarianism, which makes the opposite mistake of overrepresenting the interests of future people (by adding them all up and comparing them with the total number of us).

A general sense of pessimism hangs over the philosophy profession on this issue, driven especially by the political failures of climate change. But I think this is unnecessary and self-defeating. In fact there are lots of routes to systematising the moral claim of future generations upon us. Such as the team approach I present here, of identifying with future generations and asking 'What should we-over-time do about climate change?'. 

The team approach does not amount to a theory. You may be disappointed by how commensical its content is and how few demands it makes of you. (For example, it doesn't require your full commitment and loyalty, as 'proper' philosophical moral theories do.) Its contribution lies mainly in providing a different perspective from which to look at the same world. From that perspective, the appearance of conflict between our intuitions and our liberal democratic institutions recedes in significance. The peculiar advantage of the team approach is that in answering why we should care about something in the future we also see how to organise responsibility for achieving that goal. 

I. The Fact That We Care

I asserted that we do care about what we pass on to future generations (we just have to work out what to do about that). But some people may question this starting point. Samuel Scheffler’s thought experiment in Death and the Afterlife is helpful in illustrating and clarifying that generally shared moral intuition. (Here he is explaining it on Philosophy Bites) 
Suppose you knew that, although you yourself would live a normal life span, the earth would be completely destroyed thirty days after your death in a collision with a giant asteroid.
How would this knowledge affect your attitudes during the remainder of your life? 
The point of this exercise is to bring us to recognise something we rarely stop to notice: a great deal of the value of what we do in life comes from participating in joint enterprises at least some of the pay offs from which will be enjoyed by others perhaps not even born. We are not the self-serving hedonists we are so often told we are, and sometimes even believe ourselves to be. Take away other people's future and the value of the life options open to us change. The kind of lives we aspire to live change quite dramatically depending on what we expect to happen after those lives end. Even writing a philosophy paper becomes rather pointless if isolated from the continuing practice in which and for which it makes sense.

Scheffler argues that the bare fact that we do (mostly - this is not an argument or an opinion poll but an intuition pump) care about our after-life is already enough to ground an explicit re-evaluation of our responsibilities to those who come after us. The team approach gives that re-evaluation shape and direction. But first I must establish an additional point that enables the team approach to get up and running.

II. The Possibility of Reciprocity

It is usual to see generations as asymmetrically related in terms of power. Thus, our generation gets to choose a certain climate change mitigation/adaptation strategy and future generations just have to deal with whatever we decide. In this scenario each generation is a dictator to its successors and our only moral accountability is to our conscience about how generous to be.

But this isn't exactly true. Future generations can hold us morally accountable for our choices and can even punish us. This claim may seem outlandish at first. Bear with me. 

The first point is that humans have the gift of imagination, of generating and working through counter-factual scenarios. That allows us to extend our concerns beyond our deaths, as in Scheffler's thought experiment. We write wills for example or set up foundations (if we are rich enough) to protect or advance those concerns after death.

Besides such direct scenario planning, there is another 'social' imagination that plays a central role in our moral psychology. We model the reactions of others - imagined spectators - to what we are thinking of doing and anticipate the criticism it would receive from them. (A faculty analysed with great perspicuity by the moral philosopher Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments.) This means that we can imagine the moral reactions of the dead or not yet living to our choices. Whether the thought of their displeasure motivates us to behave less anti-socially depends on the strength of our moral character, but perhaps also on whether we recognise the power that future generations have over us.

Second, we have interests that outlive our lives (Scheffler's point). Contrary to standard approaches we needn't assume that those interests themselves are moral ones (such as concern for the welfare of future people) or that we are saints motivated entirely by moral principle (such as the duty not to do harm). This is an unnecessary resort to pure ungrounded moral theory. We can assume a much greater continuity in the circumstances of justice between people in the present and between generations.

In this world we have come to recognise others as morally real because we need the cooperation of others to secure and advance our own interests. Theory follows practice, even if it later comes to shape practice in its turn. Likewise, recognising future people as morally real doesn't require any philosophical heavy lifting. We need them to still be around and to lend their assistance in order for the things we care about to work out, whether that be preserving academic philosophy or curing cancer. That means that we have to care what future people think of us and our projects, and that means taking their moral expectations of us seriously. In particular, it means upholding some fair terms of cooperation by which our behaviour must be justifiable to future generations.

Third, we are already engaged in a gradually expanding system of intergenerational cooperation. The dead have interests that they wished to be attended to. Thanks to our social imagination, we know that they would despise us if we didn't respect their Wills. We also know that we will have interests similarly dependent on the good offices of our descendants and cannot afford to take the risk of undermining the tradition of inheritance as a responsibility. Each generation must demonstrate its commitment to this principle because each knows that it will soon be another generation's turn to make the decisions. It is rather like the case of a pay-as-you-go pension system, in which robbing the previous generation of what they had a right to expect would only succeed in destroying a scheme of intergenerational cooperation and impoverishing our own old age (on which, Joseph Heath).

Besides the Wills of individuals about family houses and heirlooms there are bigger projects and artifacts bequeathed to the care of future generations, some of which can exert a moral pressure upon us as stewards across thousands of years and huge cultural gaps. Under globalisation these responsibilities continue to expand. Consider for example our generally recognised responsibility to preserve such disparate items as First World War cemeteries, medieval cathedrals, Stonehenge, the Timbuktu Manuscripts, endangered species, and so on. Many of these are explicitly protected by international organisations (like UNESCO) and binding treaties going back to the 19th century, even - in fact especially - in times of war.
Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world..... (1954 Hague Convention)
Of course the dead could never know that we converted Stonehenge into a mall and enjoyed a short-lived craze for Panda burgers, but our descendants surely will. And we can already predict that they will despise us for it and be much less likely to honour our own projects.

To sum up, each generation in turn has decision power. Thus society is somewhat like a relay race. However, that doesn’t make our decisions independent. Future generations can harm us by repudiating our values and destroying our legacy, as happened for example in Germany after 1945, and across Eastern Europe after 1989. Common knowledge of this fact is a plausible basis for reciprocity, although, as those cases demonstrate, cooperation is not thereby guaranteed.

III. The Team View: What should we-over-time do?

This is a simple extrapolation of a team view of the individual across different time slices (as elaborated for example by Natalie Gold). Why should an individual at time t1 do anything for the individual at time t2 with whom he shares a history? For example, why should he stay home and study for tomorrow's exam rather than go out to a party? Because these individuals are obviously not independent at all. They are metaphyscially stuck with each other and ethically dependent on each other to achieve goods they cannot reach on their own, such as getting through med school and becoming a doctor and making something of their life. They have choices to make about how they should play their role on the team, but they do not have a choice about whether to join the team.

The same reasoning applies to the intergenerational case. In particular, taking up the team view is a device for systematically considering the implications of
The fact that we care
The possibility of reciprocity
In the team view we ask 'What should we-over-time do?' rather than 'What should I do for them?'. We recognise our generation (or smaller time slice - we needn't think in terms of literal generations) as a member of a team, engaging in a variety of projects of different scales and kinds whose outcomes depend on how effectively we cooperate and coordinate our actions. Costs or benefits imposed on future generations count for us, and vice versa, but the accounting is loose rather than transactional. The aim is to gain the benefits of cooperation while maintaining a reasonably fair distribution of its burdens.

As in the sports analogy, team-members who shirk their role deserve and receive moral blame, and may anticipate their vilification. It wasn't fair of the babyboomers to do nothing about climate change when it was still cheap to act on and leave a much bigger problem for us. But if we do the same that would be orders of magnitude worse. On the other hand, it wouldn't be reasonable to expect this generation to impoverish itself - and slow down economic development in the poor world - merely in order to benefit future generations. Our lives also count. If this is still too fuzzy, at least we can say that the terms of cooperation will be governed by our understanding of the reasonable expectations of other team members. For example, such reasonable expectations would surely include the minimalist utilitarian principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it" (Peter Singer). That avoids the sharp - and implausible - extremes generated by simply extending the standard theories of justice to include future people.

Intergenerational teams reason in a particular way to produce the combination of actions by different members of the team that best promotes the team’s objectives. First, while all team members are responsible for fulfilling their roles, some team members may also be in a position to play a more theoretical role as planners, setting out the broad outlines of a cooperative project and assigning roles. For example, a Mars colonisation plan might include a variety of intermediate tasks and goals to be accomplished over a 100 year timeline.

Second, an intergenerational team's reasoning is dynamic. Every member is responsible for seizing unanticipated opportunities, such as new technologies, and updating the plan accordingly. Sometimes new technologies - such as a radical breakthrough in preventing ageing - change not only the means but the goals of plans. That requires a fresh round of planning from scratch. Sometimes changes in ethics require new goals. Every generation has a responsibility to evaluate the projects and institutions passed on to them for ethical failures. In 1992, for example, white South Africans overwhelmingly voted to end Apartheid. Every generation is also responsible for considering their own values from the perspective of future generations (using that faculty of social imagination). If we fail to do so we may find everything we built swept away, our values systematically repudiated, and at the personal level even our lives despised by our own grandchildren.

IV.  Summary

So what do we owe future generations?

Insofar as we care about our after life, intergenerational cooperation is in our interest. We need there to be future people and we need them to go along with our projected interests. Once this logic is understood we have clear reason to support the indefinite sustainability of intergenerational cooperation. That includes:-
Keeping human civilisation going. This means reducing the risk of environmental catastrophe, global wars, pandemics, and so on. These might not cause human extinction but would certainly disrupt intergenerational projects - at a minimum  they would distract our descendants from looking after our stuff.
Demonstrating our commitment to fair terms of cooperation between generations, which comes down to a general duty to act only in ways we could justify to those who come after us and upon whom our after life depends. This practice generates and relies on recognising the moral reality of other generations, which we display, for example, in the way we treat the requests and legacy of previous generations. 
Playing our part in particular ongoing cooperative schemes, such as pension funds, UNESCO recognised sites, biodiversity preservation. 
Originating or updating feasible and fair plans for addressing shared interests, such as environmental stability, and which are open and flexible enough to permit adaptations and revisions by future generations.

V. Addendum: Further Benefits of the Team Approach

The original stimulus to this essay was the self-defeating pessimism dominant in political philosophy about climate change. Where we used to discuss the appropriate rate of intergenerational saving required to bring about a fully just society (Rawls), now we scrabble for reasons not to destroy future generations. In fact there are plenty of those reasons to be found if we are prepared to look beyond our standard theories of justice. The team view is just one way to translate our intuitions into contractarian reasons. (Elsewhere I have discussed another route, translating our intuitions into contractarian institutions: Votes for Future People.) However, thinking like a team has at least two further benefits.

Firstly, it brings a class of 'Colossal Moral Problems' within conceptual reach of a democracy. Climate change is only one of these, which includes the mistreatment of animals, mass poverty, or the birthright lottery of citizenship (previously). These are problems whose wrongfulness is clear enough but which we seem unable to get a grip on because ending them would be an inter-generational (or at least multi-decade) project. When we have embarked on such projects - like Britain's abolition of slavery mission or Nixon's 'War on Cancer' - we have usually done so in a fit of hubris rather than clear-eyed view of what is required. More often, we behave like smokers who would like to give up but find it hard to connect that goal to the question of whether to smoke this next cigarette.

Taking a team view of such Colossal Moral Problems fills in the amorphous space between our ultimate goals and present responsibilities by attending to the logistics of teamwork. Asking ourselves, 'What should we-over-time do?' provides us with a clear roadmap of how to get to our destination with different team members responsible for driving different sections of the route. Our own moral obligation to start driving in the right direction become clearer and less avoidable. 

Secondly, thinking like an inter-generational team can provide additional reasons to take intra-generational justice seriously. This is particularly helpful because thinking about justice towards future generations is often supposed to be in conflict with justice to those alive now. For example, climate change will accelerate much faster, making all future generations worse off, if other poor countries follow China's economic development path to prosperity.

When analysing our future interests I skipped from individuals to the human species without mentioning nation states. Yet nation states are the central fact of and limitation to thinking about justice between members of this generation. So let us take up the narrow national perspective: 'What should we-British-over-time do?' (substitute as required)

As already established, we care about how future generations see us: our actions should be justifiable towards them. Now, even if Britain's borders are the same in 100 years (i.e. including Scotland) it is very likely that our children and grandchildren will be living amongst and intermarrying with those of citizens of 'unlucky' countries like Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Eritrea. We will owe a justification to our grandchildren not only for the condition of the environment we left them, but also for the way we treated their other grandparents. Thus, just as our colonial history has come back to haunt us from within thanks to previous migration, Britain's current policies towards those countries and the problems they suffer will be part of our future history.

The upshot is that - on the assumption that globalisation continues - recognising the moral reality of future generations doesn’t conflict with justice for the present but actually provides us with new reasons to care about the lives of people alive now but far away, and to act where we can to remove oppression and hardship. We are all stuck together whether we like it or not and can no longer pretend that we are strangers between whom moral obligations are a matter of choice.
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Minggu, 25 Maret 2018

Crime Hurts. Justice Should Heal

Judicial punishment is the curious idea that individuals deserve to be punished by the state for breaking its laws. Intellectually this is rather counter-intuitive. If crime is so bad because of the social trauma it causes then setting out to hurt more people would seems a strange way to make things better. There are intellectual arguments for retributive punishment of course, many of them rather ingenious. But they have the look of post hoc rationalisations for a brute social fact: it just so happens that we like making wrongdoers suffer.

The modern criminal justice system – bloated and terroristic – is the product of government expansionism combined with this societal vindictiveness.

I
In theory there are great advantages to having the state administer criminal justice, i.e. acting as prosecutor and punisher rather than merely providing an impartial judge (as in older, less statist justice systems). In particular, by ensuring some baseline of fair treatment for less powerful victims and defendants. However, in practise state fairness is far from guaranteed. For example, it is a well-studied fact that young African-American men - a minority stereotyped as especially liable to criminality - receive systematically biased treatment at every stage of the criminal justice system: more likely to be stopped by government agents, to be arrested, to be charged, to be charged with a higher crime, to be denied bail, to be found guilty, and to be sentenced to a harsher punishment.

This is not the only way that the state's takeover of criminal justice goes awry. By converting crime from a relationship between victim and perpetrator to a relationship between a criminal and the state it has justified a vast expansion of what is criminalised and of the severity of punishment. The problem of crimes such as rape is no longer primarily understood as harms to specific people that need to be solved, but as offenses against society's laws that need to be punished. What is at stake is the dignity of society, and it is to be defended by a government always happy to take on new powers. And even if the government tries to relent it is driven onwards by our collective moral indignation, for this is politics now not morality. The interests and wishes of the actual victims of crimes play almost no role in this political dynamic.

Thinking of crime as an offence against society also drives a transition in what criminal justice is for. The problem to be solved is no longer the crime itself, but the criminal behind it who has shown himself to be an enemy of society. Even so, the true goal does not appear to be rehabilitation. Besides being a very inefficient – socially expensive – means of hurting people (something I've discussed elsewhere), the mental suffering of prison does little to advance the supposed moral goals of criminal justice. Locking millions of people into squalid little boxes for years on end and stopping them getting a job even after release doesn't make much sense as a justice programme. Not unless you fill in its real motivation: the desire to mark and hurt the enemies of society. 

Consider the idea that the judicial infliction of suffering deters people from doing evil to others, or at least highly anti-social acts (like not paying your taxes). the rational calculation of self interest is thus supposed to substitute for a moral sense for people who don't have one. There is something to this, but not nearly enough. After all, the overwhelming majority of the people in prison are not cunning fiends who profited from their misdeeds, but sad losers whose dysfunction should inspire pity and our help. As the sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh memorably put it, crime pays so badly that most crack dealers live with their moms. The majority of prisoners are there precisely because they lack the practical reasoning skills to be deterred, or else their life outside prison was not worth very much to them.

Then there is the idea that punishment is directly rehabilitative, that it teaches respect for the moral rights of others in the only language – pain – that these amoral brutes understand. This kind of punishment-based behavioural conditioning is so bizarrely out of date that it isn't even used for training animals anymore. Clickers work much better.

But there is a deeper incoherence to trying to teach morality with extrinsic incentives. The punishment approach attempts to teach respect for others through the strange device of inflicting suffering on the criminal. The prisoner is thereby directed to reflect on his imprudence not his moral failure, to regret his crime only because it has brought such harm upon himself. Prison thus functions, at its very best, in the same amoral way that hell does in some of the sillier religions.

The last argument for prison is fear. Governments routinely declare that only prison can protect civilian society from genuinely dangerous characters such as violent psychopaths. Yet there are relatively few such people and their essential characteristic – their compulsive attraction to violence – means that they respond particularly poorly to punishment, whether intended as deterrence or rehabilitation.

Moreover it is in exactly such cases that prison sentences determined by what a particular kind of crime deserves will be inappropriate. They will be backward looking, based on the quality of the crime, when the problem the psychopath poses is his propensity to future violence. Some American states tried to bridge this by declaring that some crimes or patterns of crimes deserved life sentences without parole. For example, committing 3 felonies of any kind. The attempt to protect society from a few genuinely dangerous characters using the absurd logic of retributive punishment created the world's biggest prison population, in which a person could receive an automatic life sentence for stealing a pair of socks.

II
The criminal justice system should return to its roots – a broader concern with solving crimes rather than exacting vengeance on criminals. Concepts such as restorative and distributive justice should be an important part of that. These see crime as a problem for society to solve together rather than a person to be punished by the state. Most criminals are people who need mending, not further marginalisation. Most victims – and a great deal of crime has no victim but the state – would be more satisfied in the long run to be a part of a process of restitution than to be observers of a government run retribution programme.

For example, it seems eminently more fitting and more constructive for the fraudster who embezzled old people's savings to be sentenced to work two days a week in a nursing home kitchen rather than to increase the amount of suffering in the world (and direct taxes away from the care of the elderly!) by sending him to prison to ‘pay his debt to society' by waiting for time to pass.

Similarly, the moral rehabilitation of criminals should be concerned with bringing criminals to reflect on the wrongness of what they have done and the harms they have inflicted on others. That is a rather different project than hurting criminals to encourage them to become better calculators of the costs and benefits of crime to themselves. Punishment should fit the crime in such a way that it teaches a moral lesson that goes beyond mere suffering. The fraudster working in the nursing home is likely to learn much more about the wrongness of what he did, and the rightness of being punished for it, by helping the (kind of) people he harmed than by surviving the peculiar hell of living in a small concrete room for 5 years. Being required to make amends by helping people within one's normal life fosters wider and deeper moral self-reform than living in a specially constructed total institution, a colony of hundreds of other nasty people patrolled by club-wielding guards.

The ascendancy of the retributive punishment paradigm is so complete in modern societies that it is hard to recognise its cruelty and moral absurdity, let alone to imagine an alternative. It is not really an idea to be argued out, or a policy to be reformed, but an attitude that must be overcome by progress in our social relations and emotions. Can we find a way to continue to care even for those who do the most despicable things? Can we give up the pleasure of exacting retribution for our moral indignation at the crimes suffered by other people? Can we cope with the demanding complexity of crime solving rather than the simple abstraction of criminal punishment?
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Sabtu, 24 Maret 2018

The Political Philosophy of America's Guns

America's decades long national argument about guns is not a normal political debate about addressing policy to problems, but about what kind of politics to have. It is fundamentally about how citizens should relate to each other and the state, and that makes it a matter of political philosophy, Politics with a capital P. That in turn explains why the debate seems to go round and round in circles, and the division and frustration it inspires.

Of course it is up to Americans to decide what kind of society they should have, not philosophers, and certainly not foreign ones like me. Indeed, part of my argument is that even this most fundamental question must be decided politically, by the people, and not by appeal to the special authority of sacred constitutional principles or social science or even philosophy. Philosophers' pronouncements of truth and rightness have no special authority over politics, nor should they. What philosophical analysis can do is offer new perspective and argumentative resources by which a political debate such as this one might be improved from its toxic stalemate.

So what does my philosophical perspective come down to? First a diagnosis. Both sides of the gun control debate know they are right. But only one side recognises it as a fundamentally philosophical dispute. The other has systematically evaded the real debate about values in favour of the faux objectivity of a statistical public health argument. Second some positive advice. The advocates of gun control need to take the political philosophy of the gun rights movement seriously and show that a society without guns is a better society; not that it is a safer one.

I

I'm going to have to be blunt. Gun control advocates rely excessively on a public health case that is not only much weaker than they believe it to be but also crowds out the kind of arguments that might actually win over their opponents. Their complacency that they are on the right side of history has blinded them to the fact that they have chosen to fight on the wrong ground. They keep harping on about guns killing people. As if guns were like cigarettes, and as if the numbers were big enough to matter.

Guns are an excellent killing technology. They are extremely good at transforming an intention to kill into its achievement. However, that doesn't mean that they are a particularly significant cause of death; only a particularly exciting one. The idea that forcibly removing guns from citizens would reduce death rates in any appreciable degree is a triumph of moral indignation over statistics. America is not 43rd in the world for life-expectancy because it kills so many people with guns, but, principally, because of the social gradient in health that follows from its shameful levels of socio-economic inequality (on which see the research collected in Wilkinson and Pickett's The Spirit Level).

Let's go into this a little more.

We hear a lot about the large number of deaths caused by guns in America, around 33,000 per year. This sounds like a big number. But understanding whether a number is big enough to matter requires considering it in context. 2.6 million Americans die every year [CDC]. Gun deaths represent just over 1% of deaths, and two thirds of those are suicides. From a public health perspective, many other causes of death seem much more deserving of our worry, and also more likely to yield to government intervention.

This point is reinforced by the difficulty of saving the lives of the people presently killed by guns, which follows from the central role of human intentions in their deaths. For example, the number of Americans who die in traffic accidents is now about the same as those killed by guns, a point which some gun control advocates recently made much of. But these figures are not compatible with gun death statistics and are extremely misleading in relation to the gun control debate because gun deaths are nearly all non-accidental.

When a government introduces new safety regulations for car manufacturers or drivers - airbags, seatbelts, motor-cycle helmets - it can reasonably believe that every death it removes from the traffic statistics represents a life saved. (Or at least a death postponed: everyone dies of something in the end of course, and thus it is technically true that surviving into old age is the leading cause of cancer.) But a government cannot have the same confidence that a death removed from the gun statistics represents a life saved. 

There are 11,000 gun murders per year in America [CDC]. Guns are an instrument deliberately employed for the purpose, but there are obviously other instruments, albeit less effective ones. Many murders presently committed with guns would still occur even if all of America's 300 million civilian held weapons magically disappeared. Likewise, suicide. Impulsivity is clearly a major factor in suicide, and guns - just like the Golden Gate Bridge - greatly facilitate the transformation of suicidal impulse into death. But at least some proportion of the 22,000 Americans per year who kill themselves with guns [CDC] would presumably find another way to kill themselves if they didn't have a gun. (Also, of course, you don't need the government to save you from shooting yourself in a passing moment of despair: Just don't buy one!)

The mass killings by individual crazies that so dominate the news cycle are actually the very weakest part of the public health argument for gun control. It feels like there are a lot of them – 91 since 1982, according to the database assembled by Mother Jones, a lefty online magazine. Maybe their frequency is up, and maybe their average death toll is rising, thanks to the easy availability of more powerful guns. But in a country with 320 million people and poor funding of mental health services there are always going to be murderous loonies making the national news somewhere. Such atrocities make for wonderful news stories, full of pathos and inspiring great moral indignation. But while the extensive TV coverage may make many Americans feel afraid, a few dozen deaths per year are statistically irrelevant to public health. They do not add up to a case for gun control.

Even the overarching assumption that weak gun control laws cause murders is underwhelming. The rollback of gun control laws by judges and Republican legislators began in the 1980s, but the murder rate in America has actually fallen by half since then, back to what it was in 1950 [CDC]. The reason is that rates of violence have a lot more to do with social conditions and inequality than with particular technologies. Most of America is nearly as safe as Western Europe, but some areas of concentrated hopelessness in particular cities like Chicago, Detroit and Baltimore have the murder rates of Central America. The real causes of such violence are ones that America, among rich countries, is particularly bad at addressing. That is a failure of politics but not of gun control.

In conclusion, America's gun control advocates seem to be confusing the subjective feeling of vulnerability to violence that comes with living in a society with extensive gun ownership with the objective statistical facts of risk. Perhaps this is due to their faith in the special power of facts to convince opponents – from the Latin to overcome/conquer – and thereby allow them to win a values debate without doing the hard work of making a values case. If so, the first problem is that the numbers hardly add up to an irresistible force. The second is that they have brought a statistical significance result to a political philosophy fight.

II
My argument so far may seem like politics as usual: just another attempt to knock holes in the public health case for gun control. Some readers may have already written me off as an NRA stooge with British spelling. But I intend it in another way. By showing the inadequacies of the public health case even in its own terms, I hope to persuade the proponents of gun control that a different kind of argument is required. Instead of trying to overpower their opponents with facts, they must attempt to persuade them of the values of gun control. That requires getting clear about their own vision of citizenship and government – a political philosophy of peace, not mere safety - and recognising and responding to the philosophical arguments gun rights advocates make.

Specifically, I believe that the underlying concern of gun control advocates is not objective statistical risk to our lives, but a feeling of vulnerability as citizens. Gun rights make many Americans feel afraid of what other citizens might do and that subjective feeling matters in a way that mere statistics cannot. Americans worry about arguments over parking spaces turning into gunfights and about racist fools shooting their son for wearing a threatening hoodie. And they worry about maniacs with military style weapons turning up at their children's school, or their church, or at an open-air music festival.

In this light, mass killings matter not because they present a significant public health risk to our lifespans to be analysed like car accidents or cigarettes, but because they are deliberate attacks on our society to be analysed like terrorism. Mass killers are nearly always loners lacking the political organisation and agenda of regular terrorists, but they nevertheless engage in symbolic violence against civic institutions, such as schools, that is particularly terrifying exactly because it is so impersonal: the victims of their violence are merely interchangeable extras in the screenplay they are trying to produce. Mass killings are not interpersonal squabbles but deliberate attacks on the peace itself, and this is something citizens have the right to hold their government responsible for.

It is a truism of political philosophy that a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for the legitimacy of any state is its ability to provide its citizens with freedom from fear. But there are different routes to this. Some believe that they can only overcome this feeling of vulnerability with the right to carry a gun of their own (hence the spike in gun sales after every mass shooting). Others want the freedom to live as civilians rather than in a state of militaristic hypervigilance always ready and alert to respond to deadly attack. 

There are thus two views of government and citizenship in play. In one political philosophy, government is there to help good citizens defend their rights and liberties for themselves. In the other, government is expected to guarantee security directly by removing the sources of fear.

There is a reason most gun control advocates are on what passes for the left in American politics, and why they are often mocked as ‘European'. This is fundamentally a dispute about how citizens should relate to the state, and especially a dispute between the state as a guarantor of security (after the timid absolutism of Hobbes) or as a guarantor of liberty (after the rebellious Locke).

III
Banning guns would save some American lives, though not as many as the standard presentation of the public health case implies. But the same logic would justify banning cars. Of course no one proposes that because it is generally agreed that cars provide benefits that outweigh their dangerousness. (Even environmentalists who refuse to drive a car for moral reasons aren't motivated by road deaths.) It is a symptom of their political blindness that gun control advocates refuse to admit the obvious political fact: that guns have benefits as well as costs.

This brings me to what guns do for people. Of course they do various things. They are beautifully made objects that also, as the lefty gun-lover Dan Baum puts it, like sky-diving give off "a little contact high from the Grim Reaper". But they also make people feel more powerful and thus, indirectly, more in possession of their political rights as citizens: less willing to put up with being over-managed and under-respected by the state. Dan Baum again:
"Going armed has connected me with an entire range of values I didn't use to think much about—self-reliance, vigilance, muscular citizenship—and some impulses I'd rather avoid, like social pessimism and irrational fear. It has militarized my life; all that locking and loading and watching over my shoulder makes me feel like a bit player in the perpetual global war in which we find ourselves. There's no denying that carrying a gun has made my days a lot more dramatic. Suddenly, I'm dangerous. I'm an action figure. I bear a lethal secret into every social encounter."
The gun rights movement seems to me to reflect a heroic vision of citizenship, and hence of society, that taps into an enduring strain of rugged individualism in America's political psychology. Most Western polities are characterised by an overwhelming emotional and institutional dependence on a beneficent, all seeing, all powerful government. This plays a significant role in American politics too - just look at how Americans from all points on the political spectrum responded to 9/11 by demanding the federal government do whatever it took to make them feel safe again. However, America also has a long Lockean tradition which emphasises the enduring independence of the individuals who make up a political society, including their right to revolution if the state fails to fulfil its responsibilities. This political philosophy has been resurgent on the right since the Reagan revolution.

In this vision, government is seen as a convenience not a necessity, an institution that should depend on society rather than the other way around. Government allows some collective action problems to be overcome, thereby enhancing the provision of public goods and law and order that make everyone better off. But otherwise it should get out of the way so that people can get on with their own business.

Even when limited to its proper domain, faith in government is distinctly limited. Government is analysed as any other institution, a vested interest whose powers can be dangerous as well as useful to society. The wide distribution of power throughout American society - including the power of violence conferred by civilian gun ownership - may be socially inefficient, but it is supposed to reduce such dangers. If guns are sometimes used against society that may be a price worth paying to maintain a free society.  

I want to emphasise here that this is an interesting and even attractive political philosophy. It deserves to be taken seriously. For example, America's social contract does not depend on the government in the same way that Europe's do. If their government were to collapse, go wrong, or to be toppled by invasion, I think Americans would be temperamentally far better prepared to get on with things than Europeans.

So how do guns relate to this political philosophy? Contra certain second amendment fantasists, armed citizens do not deter government tyranny by putting a power behind the people's theoretical right to revolution. Nevertheless, gun rights do reflect and support a different vision of the relationship between citizens and state. 

Having in your pocket a device capable of a miniature whirlwind of mayhem makes people feel more like something to be reckoned with. Unlike the sheeple who have reduced themselves to pathetically pleading for the government to save them from bad guys, these citizen heroes willingly take up their share of responsibility to protect themselves and others in society. Such faith in their own powers and abilities spills over into political citizenship. By making citizens feel less dependent on the institutions of the state to guarantee their freedom and security, guns allow them to believe that they are in a position to bargain with the state rather than to submit, like frightened sheep, to its authority to decide what is best for them.

Those advocating gun control need to recognise that the gun rights movement has become entwined with a philosophical view about the soul of America. This presents a greater challenge than they have tended to acknowledge. John Locke's political philosophy is part of America's DNA. America was founded upon a Lockean view of the social contract, a device for securing and extending the liberties of citizens rather than advancing aggregate social welfare (or social justice); for resisting tyrannical government rather than encouraging its benevolence. His natural rights arguments and assumptions permeate America's founding documents and the logic of the Second Amendment itself.

Gun control advocates cannot win this political debate by mobilising their own supporters with morally indignant recitations of the statistics, nor by delegitimising their opponents as mentally ill. Besides falling far short of the ideal of democratic deliberation this is also a strategic failure. This is not a fringe movement that can be shouted down or voted down, but a constituency that must be substantially won over for a political shift of this magnitude. Gun rights activists talk constantly about their political philosophy. Persuading them means taking their ideas seriously and convincing them of the value of gun control in their own terms.

I see two (complementary) paths for achieving this.

IV
The first is for gun control advocates to engage directly with the political philosophy debate, which they haven't really done up to now. They should articulate and defend their own vision of political society and citizenship, which at present seems rather woolly. They should explain the difference between a political philosophy of peace and a Hobbesian tyranny of frightened sheeple. They might, for example, explain that progressivism is a respectable form of liberalism - in fact a Deweyan pragmatic form indigenous to America - and a more effective partner for advancing the freedoms of individuals than America's version of Locke.

The pragmatic view I have in mind embodies a healthy and heartily American skepticism of the state without lapsing into the paranoid cynicism of some contemporary followers of Locke. For example, while progressives see the state as a partner in society's projects of self-improvement, that is because of its special powers to make laws and raise money; not because it has some special faculty of judgement that supersedes that of the citizenry. It is a partner not an overlord, valued for what it can help achieve in terms of problem-solving, not because it deserves awe and respect as the constitutional sovereign, representative of the true will of the people, Hobbesian saviour, or what have you.

One aspect of that is an orientation to localism in time and space, since that is the scale at which problems generally need to be solved. As I noted, American gun violence is highly localised and closely related to socio-economic failures that state and city governments have many tools to address, and which America's decentralised democracy puts within reach of ordinary citizens to demand. The trouble with pragmatism as a method of politics is that solving real problems is difficult and produces many failures along the way. In contrast, campaigning for a law has a pleasing simplicity, even if it is as useful as a ban on cancer.

Pragmatism requires an experimentalist see-what-works attitude rather than merely applying your theory of society to every problem, and giving the same answer to every question. The law and order approach that began in the 1980s and is now finally being rolled back was predicated on such a theory, a foolish one that divided the world into bad guys and good guys, and assumed that bad guys could only be controlled by deterrence. It abjectly failed to address the circumstances of violence and the right of citizens to be free of it. A pragmatic politics would have demanded more evidence of real world success before expanding such draconian powers of the state against its people. And it would have scrutinised individual policies relentlessly - from the overarching war on drugs to minimum sentencing and racial profiling - to see how they might be reformed and improved.

Moreover, while a pragmatic politics respects what works, and thus the known quantity of inherited institutions, it has no particular respect for tradition in itself. That is because even institutions and laws that successfully solved or prevented problems in the past - such as the second amendment defence against tyranny and the return of the English - may end up causing new problems if they do not evolve to fit changing conditions and needs.

Properly explained, progressivism seems to satisfy many of the concerns that draw Americans to Locke's philosophy of defending individual rights against the state. The unpopularity of such pragmatism on the right seems to relate to disagreement about what counts as a problem in the first place; such as whether gender- and racial inequality are things the state should do something about. But that is a normal political disagreement between those more or less satisfied with the status quo, not a disagreement about how politics itself should go.

But this is not the end of the argument. For it seems to me that despite Locke's central place in the theory of America, his ideas have not actually done much service. Recall that Locke's account is most associated with individuals hanging on to their personal rights (to life, liberty and property) even while agreeing to live under a government. Critics of progressive liberalism complain that a government dedicated to solving social problems will often trample over the rights of individuals that stand in the way of increasing aggregate welfare. We need individual rights to prevent such excesses, they say, and therefore we need Lockean constraints and a muscular citizenry that will insist on them.

One thing to point out is that however inspirational Locke may have been for its founding fathers, the actual history of American government doesn't seem to hew very closely to Locke's values and constraints. The American social contract was apparently compatible with the genocides of Native Americans, economic dependence on racial slavery, the suppression of women, mass conscription in wars of choice, moralistic laws against contraception and homosexuality, and so on. 

But more importantly, a muscular citizenry has become a goal in its own right rather than merely a means to restrain government. And that is a mistake incompatible with a civilised society. Where every citizen must retain responsibility for upholding the law and judging the use of deadly force, every individual must be a hero or else a victim (or else a villain), in a pre-political Homeric world in which society is no more than a band of heroes. Hence the strange belief - which appears central to the gun rights movement; see for example the popularity of stand your ground laws - that the world is divided into good guys and bad guys, and the government has no right to interfere in what the good guys get up to. This is neither attractive nor feasible nor Lockean. A society fit only for heroes is not a fit society to live in, but rather resembles a nostalgic fantasy of movies of the Wild West.

Still, a society of sheeple uninterested in anything but getting on with their own small lives is an appalling prospect. There should be heroes: citizens willing to stand up for more than themselves.

Fortunately the choice is not binary. The second approach to debating gun control is to disentangle guns from the ideal of strong citizenship.

V
Let's start by uprooting the myth. Handguns, or even those AR-15s that are so popular with mass shooters recently, are not going to stop the US army from crushing you if that's what it has a mind to do. (Fatuous comparisons with terrorist insurgencies like ISIS or the Taliban will not do. Unless your idea of strong citizenship is extorting concessions from the government by threatening a terrorist campaign against your fellow civilian citizens.) 

Gun rights may induce a feeling of political significance and that feeling may be of significant power. Yet, the first thing to note is that this feeling is founded on a delusion as great as that of the sports enthusiast who looks up from his bowl of Buffalo wings to shout instructions at the football players on the TV screen. And, second, gun rights, like Buffalo wings, introduce new health problems of their own into society.

This is because, besides fostering political assertiveness in defence of classical liberal views of the state, extensive gun ownership also undermines the very society it is supposed to defend against tyrannical government. Gun rights introduce a new fear and distance between fellow citizens, whether they choose to arm themselves or not. As the philosopher Firmin DeBrabander argues, an armed society is a polite society not because everyone in it recognises that others deserve respect, but only because everyone is afraid to say or do anything that might be considered threatening.
"Our gun culture promotes a fatal slide into extreme individualism. It fosters a society of atomistic individuals, isolated before power — and one another — and in the aftermath of shootings such as at Newtown, paralyzed with fear. That is not freedom, but quite its opposite."
Here is where the feeling of vulnerability to guns comes into political significance. Guns were supposed to protect society from threats, including from its own government. But instead they undermine its health from within, weakening civil society and leaving us unable to relate to each other except via the legalistic forms controlled by the state or else down the barrel of mutual suspicion, as in a spaghetti Western. The great irony of gun rights is that they actually make citizens more dependent on the state and less able to resist it because we lose the sense of solidarity that a civilian society so readily supports. 

This is an entirely different conception of public health than the calculation of individuals' statistical risk of being shot. It directly addresses the very concern gun rights activists claim to be defending, the very benefit they claim makes guns worth having.

But there is one more line of positive argument to make. For, fortunately, gun rights are not the only path to strong citizenship. If heroic citizenship is about taking up your share of responsibility to protect yourself and others from tyrannical lawlessness or legalised tyranny then America's own history shows that gun rights are not necessary for it. The civil rights movement is probably the most impressive demonstration of the power that citizens can mobilise against tyrannical government, but there are plenty of other more recent models of strong citizenship, from the progressive liberalism of #blacklivesmatter to the classical liberalism of Edward Snowden. 

These movements succeed, when they do, by relying on the social relations that gun rights undermine. They do not shout up at the government demanding to get their way or else. Instead they bypass the government and address the people themselves.  ‘Here's a problem', they say, ‘and this what we think should be done. If you agree let's tell the government what to do.'

VI
I share the intuition of many Americans that there is something very wrong with a society in which peace is supposed to be achieved by each individual's fear of every other's capability for deadly force. I understand their appal at the gun rights pundits lining up on mainstream media after every atrocity to sombrely declare that the only solution to bad guys with guns is for good guys with guns to step up and volunteer to guard schools. This is not the kind of society I would want to live in either.

But the problems with this society are not the actuarial risks it imposes on individuals, nor even the defiant take it or leave it attitude towards government associated with the second amendment. Rather it is the relations between citizens that suffer most in an armed society. This is a harm that at least a large proportion of believers in gun rights could be persuaded to take seriously, since it undermines the very integrity and resilience of society - and thus its independence of government - that is central to their political philosophy.

The challenge for gun control advocates is to discipline and focus their moral indignation. They cannot win a philosophical argument about what kind of politics to have by appealing to the objectivity of death statistics. Significance is a value judgement not a mathematical operation. One cannot prove that America has a disproportionate number of gun deaths without engaging with the positive value attributed to gun ownership, just as one cannot use the number of traffic deaths to straightforwardly prove that cars should be banned. To win the politics they must win over their opponents or at least weaken their vehemence. That means leaving aside the question of whether or not guns kill 'too many' people and engaging instead with the contradiction between the motives of the political philosophy of gun rights and what it actually achieves.

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